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CHAPTER 12
Water as Global Social Policy—International 




If you pick up a book on water politics—practically any book on the 
topic – you are almost certain to find a claim like this: water doesn’t obey 
political boundaries. Usually, the quick inference is that water conflicts are 
likely; a logical step that combines the fact that water began flowing eons 
before politics were around to be obeyed with the political reality that 
many international borders operate with varying degrees of reference to 
scarce water resources. An arguably more interesting point, however, is 
the leitmotif such claims convey. Namely, that global water policy requires 
an effective combination of space and politics. Among the potential com-
binations, several leading contenders populate a wide literature. There are 
spaces of empires, nations, states, mega-cities, agricultural regions, water-
sheds (or river basins), local communities, Indigenous peoples and, 
increasingly, aquatic ecosystems themselves. Opposite these, politics 
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crisscross state sovereignty, treaties, rights, customs, Indigenous laws, 
technical criteria, infrastructure, economics, guesswork, and in some cases, 
equity. Intersections of space and politics anchor two aims of this chapter. 
The first is to map how International Organizations (IOs) have shaped, 
and continue to shape, global water policy. The second is to consider how 
IOs have influenced global discourses. These two aims support a more 
ambitious argument: that water be treated as global social policy – not as 
merely instrumental to the public management of social risks in other 
domains.
This chapter has four sections: The first defends a key premise of the 
argument that water is social and not only natural. The second maps the 
historical role IOs have played in colonial and state hydrological programs. 
Here, IOs actively shaped key parameters of what it meant to act interna-
tionally on water policy. This affected the subsequent rise of global water 
policy. The third identifies the role of IOs in driving discourses of global 
water policy, particularly those of scarcity and security that link the envi-
ronmental, economic, and political risks connected to water. Here, there 
are similarities with other environmental areas where Cold War scientific 
networks collaborated with IOs to forge global approaches to social policy 
through hybrid networks of epistemic authority. But there are also impor-
tant differences owing to how IOs critiqued early approaches to sustain-
able development for inadequate attention to water. This catalyzed efforts 
to make water central to social and industrial policy, largely through what 
is known as integrated water resources management (IWRM). That proj-
ect reached its height in the 1990s. The fourth section focuses on how, as 
IWRM waned, IOs redeployed their influence to govern considerations of 
risk and security in response to global environmental change and eco-
nomic crises. This approach now dominates global water discourse and 
demands critique regarding for whom water has become a domain of global 
social policy.
SocIal Water
Water is not taught as something that is social. In fact, only a small fraction 
of the diagrams used to represent Earth’s water cycle in textbooks include 
humans (15%) and even fewer (2%) identify human impacts on the global 
water system (Abbott et al. 2019). This is a serious oversight. Humans 
have been appropriating more than half of the annual available freshwater 
since 1995 and have pushed the hydrological cycle so far off balance that 
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it no longer operates within the normal bounds of variability (Postel et al. 
1996; Milly et al. 2008). The upshot is that the image most people have 
in their heads of the global water cycle – implicit in much of water policy – 
is deeply flawed. Water does not flow carefree through an eternal, stable 
cycle of evaporation, condensation, and precipitation from the oceans 
through the atmosphere and back to earth. To that image, we must add a 
growing litany of ways in which humans short-circuit water systems: 
microplastics in raindrops, pharmaceutical loading in rivers, tens of thou-
sands of mega-dams, increased water vapor from climate change, glaciers 
and ice sheets in rapid retreat, a warming and increasingly acidic ocean, 
severe droughts, and monsoons that by turns fail to materialize or intensely 
burst in ways not previously experienced.
How can we think of water in social terms? Anthropologists have 
described water as a “total social fact” owing to how it is not only bio-
physically necessary for social life, but also constitutive of multiple institu-
tions of social life (economic, religious, health) such that decisions in one 
domain cannot be cleanly parsed from others (Orlove and Caton 2010, 
402). Part of this has to do with the materiality of water itself and the fact 
that it is shared by upstream and downstream communities, cities, and 
nations. Another aspect, however, is water’s position amid social norms. 
For instance, access to water, such as for household connections, often 
functions as the material and social site for making demands on the state 
for public goods, and even for citizenship itself (von Schnitzler 2016; 
Anand 2017). Anthropologists are not alone in their assessment of water 
as not wholly social but not only natural. Geographers and many others 
have similarly studied the constitutive role of water in social relations. 
Recently, this approach has also been extended to connect the practices of 
scientists and hydrologists to global discourses (Schmidt 2017; Dry 2019). 
This provides a route to think about water both socially and globally and, 
I argue here, to consider the historic role of IOs in forging these links. 
Among the earliest attempts to think of water globally and socially was by 
Julian Huxley (1935, 1943), the enthusiastic eugenicist and United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) 
first Director-General, who lauded the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
in the United States for its model of integrating water control and social 
policy across education, health, and rural development. Huxley thought 
the TVA a model for UNESCO itself. The most influential instance of 
water as social policy, however, is surely cost-benefit analysis, which was 
given its original expression in the 1936 Flood Control Act in the United 
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States before it went on to become virtually ubiquitous in social, eco-
nomic, and environmental policy (Porter 1995; Kysar 2010).
Understanding water socially also provides resources for examining 
contests and conflicts. It does so by virtue of identifying how different 
social practices – legal, economic, scientific, religious – are themselves not 
free of the material constraints water sets: it evaporates, it gets polluted, it 
flows, it floods, it erodes infrastructure, it squirrels away across property 
boundaries, and it is variable in its distribution over space and time. As a 
result, politics are not external to the practices that give an account of 
where water is and when. That we can think of water socially, however, still 
requires an approach to doing so. Mine will become evident throughout 
the chapter (see Schmidt 2017) as one set against popular versions of 
social constructivists in which water is wholly social; a hydrosocial cycle 
such as Linton (2010, 3) proposes when he argues that “Water is what we 
make of it.” Water can be many things, but a flouter of physics is not 
among them. As a result, centering the material account of water is key. 
Where does this leave us with respect to the politics of international orga-
nizations? First, we can follow others who have laid the groundwork for 
thinking of IOs in the water sector as entangled with social conflict, con-
tests, and discourses not sufficiently captured by theories of rational deci-
sion making (Conca 2006; cf. Murphy 1994). Second, we can recognize 
that, like other domains of global social policy, changes in the water sector 
frequently pace changes in global governance generally. Here, we can 
extend Abbott et al.’s (2016) analysis of how structures of global gover-
nance shift to also think about their material undercurrents. To do so, this 
chapter contests the premise of historically powerful actors that water be 
treated non-socially  – as merely a ‘natural resource’—in the first place 
(Schmidt 2017; Scott 1998).
From rIver BaSIn organIzatIonS to gloBal IoS: 
HIStorIcal context
Historically, water IOs are of two main types. One is populated by inter-
national river basin organizations (RBOs) that are spatially oriented to 
transboundary waters shared by two or more countries. Often, though not 
always, these are organized according to the physical space that directs 
water flows – the river basin or watershed. Owing to the diversity of these 
political and spatial environments, RBOs exhibit considerable variety, 
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diversity, and levels of authority (see Schmeier 2012; Lautze et al. 2013). 
Some operate at the level of treaties, others advise (officially or unoffi-
cially) on technical or economic concerns, some are imposed, still others 
limp along. RBOs often reflect regional and transnational power relations 
that establish discursive and material hegemony – hydro-hegemony – over 
transboundary waters (Mirumachi 2015; Warner et al. 2017). There are 
presently over 120 RBOs that operate on 110 international watercourses 
worldwide; a tally dutifully kept in an open-access database by Oregon 
State University’s Program in Water Conflict Management and 
Transformation.1 In 1997, the UN Watercourses Convention was adopted 
to provide international norms regarding the use and conservation of 
water crossing international borders. This was accomplished largely by 
codifying existing utilitarian norms as the basis for pursuing equitable 
water sharing arrangements (Blatter and Ingram 2001). Where did these 
norms come from? A second group of IOs played a key role. This group 
includes actors more familiar to other domains of global social policy and 
which also influenced RBOs, such as the World Bank. These IOs are not 
constrained to watersheds or state territories, and often are explicitly ori-
ented to projects advantageous to global industry, agricultural trade, and 
finance. In this section, and as Fig. 12.1 illustrates, I provide a snapshot of 
how RBO experiences and IO interactions influenced one another and 
how both began to shift when ‘global’ water policy began to take shape 
with the launch of UNESCO’s International Hydrological Decade.
Projects of state-making often exercised control over water as a consti-
tutive aspect of spatial rule. These projects could have international dimen-
sions if either water itself crossed existing borders between states or when 
colonial powers appropriated water elsewhere. Mitchell (2002) argues 
that colonial thinking about water, space, and politics continues to exert 
contemporary influence. He’s correct. The draining of marshes for farm-
land and cities, the damming and straightening of rivers, and the establish-
ment and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure all provide the material 
evidence for the moral ordering of water under different state-making 
projects (Scott 1998; Pisani 2002; Blackbourn 2006; Pritchard 2011; 
Gilmartin 2015; Pietz 2015). When these state-making projects were 
exported to colonies they remade landscapes and social relationships 
(Mitchell 2002; D’Souza 2006; Bhattacharyya 2018). In so doing, 
1 See: https://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu/content/international-river-
basin-organization-rbo-database. Accessed March 21, 2020.
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colonialism exported not only techniques for controlling water, but also 
an approach to water politics aligned to Eurocentric, racialized notions of 
the ‘international’ constituted by recognition and reciprocity among sov-
ereign nations (Pitts 2018).
For instance, as Yao (2019) shows, ‘control over nature’ was central to 
how the ‘international’ was constituted in nineteenth century debates over 
civilization and progress. These debates stem from the first international 
RBO: the Danube Commission established in 1856. The Danube 
Commission was especially occupied with whether Russia’s lack of territo-
rial control over the Danube River met (or did not meet) the Eurocentric 
‘standard of civilization’ (Yao 2019). A peculiar, if not quite universal 
Fig. 12.1 Global water policy IOs: scale and discourse
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feature of applying the so-called ‘standard of civilization’ was the pre-
dominance of engineering as both a practice and disposition to reconciling 
water with political boundaries. One can only control nature with the 
right tools, and engineering was a main one. There were many complicat-
ing factors to using engineering as a kind of social test, especially owing to 
the challenges that arose when water control required technical feats that 
engineering hadn’t yet mastered (Mukerji 2009). But there were advan-
tages to using engineering for social ends because it was the kind of exper-
tise that could travel. Facilitated by colonial networks like those of the 
Dutch and British, engineers shaped and reshaped landscapes across the 
Middle East, and South and South East Asia (Fasseur 1992; Amrith 2018). 
Beyond overt colonialism, engineering became a key practice for harness-
ing water in ways that aligned standards of civilization premised on the 
‘control of nature’ with the spatialization of ‘international’ water politics. 
In short, to qualify for reciprocal international agreements was to be able 
to engineer control over water.
The emergence of transnational water engineering expertise in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave rise to a diverse set of discur-
sive and technical practices for states and for RBOs (Teisch 2011). Owing 
to considerable diversity across RBOs (see Mukhtarov and Gerlak 2013), 
I focus not on the historical contingencies of individual RBOs but rather 
on how state-making projects began to intersect with the IOs that act 
globally. The Indian case provides an excellent example: The first major 
hydrological project after India gained independence from Britain was a 
multi-purpose river basin development scheme for irrigation, electricity, 
and flood control in West Bengal. The Damodar Valley Corporation (still 
in operation today) established the idea of a ‘nationalist engineer’ as one 
who controlled water in lockstep with advancing national Indian identity 
(Klingensmith 2007). The explicit organizational model for the Damodar 
Valley Corporation was the TVA of the United States, a factor that mat-
tered critically in a conflict over the Indus River on the eastern side of 
India with neighboring Pakistan in 1951. In that case, tensions over how 
to share the Indus river were at fever pitch after the World Bank struggled 
to broker a deal between the two nations. Then, the second director of the 
TVA, David Lilienthal, managed to get both parties to the table, in part by 
appealing to the American model of development as a common discourse 
for multi-purpose river basin planning (Mason and Asher 1973; Ekbladh 
2010; Gilmartin 2015).
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In the Indus case, a shared ethos of water control and state identity 
helped shoulder the burden of international negotiation that allowed 
expertise from the TVA to first shape ‘nationalist’ engineers in India and 
then broker an RBO mediated by the World Bank. The Indian case was 
not entirely unique. Post-WWII, America’s TVA was exported to dozens 
of countries as the quintessential model of ‘international development’ 
promoted by UN agencies, such as UNESCO (see Scott 2006; Ekbladh 
2010). Notably in the Mekong River in Southeast Asia, the TVA provided 
a key organizational model (Biggs 2006; Ekbladh 2010). In 1957, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East backed 
the creation of the Mekong Committee (later the Interim Mekong 
Committee) following the independence of Cambodia, Laos PDR, and 
Vietnam from France (Matthews and Schmidt 2014). The creation of an 
RBO on the Mekong subsequently went through different permutations 
as the seven countries making claims to the river sought – or were com-
pelled to seek  – an international coordinating organization (Gardner 
1997; Biggs 2011). The cases of the Indus and Mekong also speak to a 
larger dynamic in which the control of water was increasingly connected 
to broader, global discourses about international coordination for 
development.
One effect of using the river basin, or watershed, as the spatial scale for 
RBOs was the emergence of a discourse on integrated river basin planning 
by the United Nations (1958; White 1957). Driven by the insight that it 
is better to coordinate the use of shared waters than not to, RBOs and IOs 
soon developed a shared discourse of integration. However, and as even a 
quick perusal of the University of Oregon’s RBO database reveals, the 
organizational structure, funding mechanisms, and economic and data- 
sharing agreements among RBOs vary widely and do not easily reveal a 
straightforward model of ‘integration’ (cf. Schmeier 2012). This diversity 
posed challenges for fostering international norms of integration for 
RBOs, exemplified by the fact that it took four decades until the UN con-
vention on watercourses was adopted in 1997. It may be too strong to 
draw direct causal links, but that convention was made more likely as the 
result of IOs who moved RBO discourses on ‘integration’ from the inter-
national sphere to the global.
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IoS and gloBal Water PolIcy
The shift from international to global water politics officially  began in 
1977 with the United Nations Conference on Water in Mar del Plata, 
Argentina. The impetus for the 1977 conference was not water control per 
se, but rather an integrated global approach to water that individual states 
had no prospect of controlling. Namely, the cumulative effects of water 
use that could affect the global water cycle itself. A decade earlier, that 
concern had been the catalyst for hydrologists in the United States to 
propose an International Hydrological Decade (IHD), which was con-
vened by UNESCO from 1965–74. The IHD operated, like many inter-
national scientific networks during the Cold War, by appealing to – indeed 
establishing notions of  – scientific objectivity presumed independent of 
national interests (cf. Reisch 2005; Wolfe 2018). Directed by the American 
Raymond Nace, the IHD combined Russian hydrological expertise with 
an expansive network of international engineers and scientists. It was 
through the IHD, in fact, that hydrology ‘came of age’ as a science, as 
Nace (1980) would later put it. In this section, I outline how, as the search 
for ‘integration’ moved from the international to the global, existing IOs 
evolved and new IOs began to populate global water policy.
Although UNESCO formally convened the IHD, it also reached out to 
the World Meteorological Organization (previously known as the 
International Meteorological Organization). Again, space and politics 
combined to socially affect water as international scientific collaborations 
established and standardized the field of global hydrology. This time, as 
Nace (1967, 550) captured at the outset of the IHD, the issue was that 
water challenges were “a global problem with local roots.” That is, a chal-
lenge of linking local temporal and spatial variability at the scale of indi-
vidual watersheds to the global water cycle. The task of IHD scientists was 
to link these scales objectively. Indeed, the goal was to fit scientific hydrol-
ogy with universal categories, such as those implied by Nace’s (1969) 
interim report entitled Water and Man: A World View. Supporting this 
project, a raft of reports told similar stories of ‘water and man’ and the 
universal co-evolution of hydrology and societies. These did not displace 
the racial categories entrained in the ‘international’ and instead universal-
ized human-water histories in more teleological fashion, where evolution 
toward global water politics naturally reflected social progress (e.g. Biswas 
1970; Fitzsimmons and Salama 1977).
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At the mid-point of the IHD, in 1971, a new expert IO was created. 
The International Water Resources Association (IWRA) evolved out of 
the American Water Resources Association and held its first World Water 
Congress in 1973  in Chicago. The IWRA quickly became a key global 
knowledge broker as its epistemic community helped forge the emerging 
discourse of global water policy through meetings and its journal, Water 
International, which it launched in 1975. By the end of the IHD, in 
1974, the familiar empirical picture of the hydrological cycle critiqued 
above – lacking people – had quantified the global water system. After the 
IHD ended, a series of international events and actors began to prepare 
for the 1977 UN Conference on Water in Mar del Plata. The IWRA, as 
well as the International Institute of Environment and Development (also 
founded in 1971) began to partner with global organizations such as 
UNESCO, HABITAT, and the World Bank to orient global water gover-
nance toward a dual assessment of water’s global distribution as mapped 
against human needs. At Mar del Plata, these two pillars provided the basis 
for a new discourse of water scarcity that ported the scientific objectivity 
of global hydrology over to social policy. The putatively objective basis of 
the new discourse on water scarcity provided a way to incorporate the 
engineering of water control with social policy in what was known as 
Rational Planning (Biswas 1978). Rational Planning was not unique to 
water (see Lindblom 1999), but in this sector it used water’s statistical 
variability in any particular state as the basis for decision making. These 
statistical distributions continue to travel widely and have been rehearsed 
innumerable times in descriptions of the Earth’s water, in which oceans 
account for around 97% of the total water on the planet, freshwater only 
3%. Of the latter, most is locked in ice or deep underground, with the 
remaining freshwater comprising a scarce reservoir that ought to be man-
aged rationally to achieve utilitarian ends of maximum well-being. This 
empirical account was bolstered by the water atlas published by UNESCO 
just after the IHD ended (Korzoun et al. 1978).
Discourses of water scarcity established in Mar del Plata arrived just 
prior to the widespread adoption of neoliberal policies that sought an 
enhanced – in some versions exclusive – role for free markets in environ-
mental sectors. At Mar del Plata, similar ideas were in circulation as the 
idea of water scarcity was interpreted by the World Bank as requiring forms 
of water pricing to enhance conservation (Warford 1978). As neoliberal 
policies were applied in structural adjustment programs in Chile and else-
where in the 1980s (often supported by the World Bank and other parties 
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to the ‘Washington Consensus’) they became a live testing ground that 
produced mixed results not only for privatization but also for discourses of 
global water policy (Bauer 2004; Goldman 2005; Boelens et al. 2010). 
Through discourses of water scarcity, however, an emerging role for water 
specific IOs arose. By this time, the International Water Resources 
Association had convened its World Water Congress several times since its 
inaugural launch in the 1970s, and routinized meetings involving scien-
tists, government officials, and non-governmental organizations met every 
2 or 3 years. This meant that when neoliberalism hit the ground there was 
already an established global network of water expertise intersecting with 
other IOs such as the World Bank or the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (see Schmidt 2017).
The IWRA proved a critical IO in the 1980s, especially in its response 
to the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development 
report, Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report on 
sustainable development. Members of the IWRA (1991) critiqued Our 
Common Future for what they perceived as insufficient attention to water 
issues. Then, determined not to let the upcoming opportunity to put 
water on the sustainable development agenda at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
pass, they organized a preliminary meeting in Dublin. The conference 
produced what are known as the “Dublin Principles,” which concretized 
neoliberal policies in many respects by declaring that water “has an eco-
nomic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an eco-
nomic good” (Dublin Statement 1992, np). The principle came fourth in 
a list, and as a way to integrate water’s environmental importance, the 
need for participatory forms of management, and the unique role of 
women in provisioning and safeguarding water under conditions of scar-
city. It also became a flashpoint of conflict and contest as IOs began to 
push the idea of integrated water resources management, or IWRM, based 
on the Dublin Principles into global sustainability agendas.
Through IOs like the World Bank, UNESCO, and the IWRA, the idea 
of IWRM became virtually hegemonic in the 1990s as a way to integrate 
human and environmental water uses while maximizing human well-being 
(Conca 2006). The upshot of IWRM’s ‘integration’ of global hydrology 
and water pricing was congruent with what Bernstein (2001) described as 
the “liberal compromise” of sustainable development: the promotion of 
markets as the most effective instrument for environmental relief. This 
compromise solidified further in the 1990s through the creation of new 
IOs that carried both a technical and social remit, such as the Global Water 
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Partnership (GWP) in 1996. The Global Water Partnership (2000) soon 
established itself as a key knowledge broker through a series of influential 
Technical Reports on IWRM that argued water was both a social and eco-
nomic good (Rogers et al. 1998). The GWP continues to play a key role 
in promoting IWRM worldwide as it has expanded to include over 3000 
partner organizations in 183 countries. The same year, the World Water 
Council was launched. An outcome of a special session at the IWRA World 
Water Congress in 1994, this new IO sought more direct political influ-
ence for the water sector in global economic and environmental policy. It 
quickly launched its own journal, Water Policy, to help establish credibility 
as a multi-stakeholder convenor and also began to convene triennial World 
Water Forums. Its editor-in-chief, Jerome Delli Priscoli (2000), explicitly 
sought to naturalize ‘integration’ in the water sector; he claimed it arose 
from a universal human longing to return to the comfort of the womb.
Water IoS: From IWrm to gloBal SocIal rISkS
At the turn of the new millennium, water IOs took stock. Many of the 
projects promoting IWRM were faltering, often critiqued for weighting 
technical criteria of water control too heavily and not paying sufficient 
attention to social contexts or institutions (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; 
Dellapenna and Gupta 2008). Even for the World Bank (2004) IWRM 
had lost its luster, not least owing to backlash against water privatization 
and social resistance to neoliberalism (see Olivera 2004). Adding further 
urgency was the 2006 United Nations Development Program (2006) 
report on the inequitable connections of water scarcity, social power, and 
poverty. The ensuing reappraisal of IWRM, however, also took place in a 
context where humans were altering the global water system (Schmidt 
2013). The rational approach to water scarcity soon incorporated emerg-
ing, adaptive approaches to resource management and governance as well 
as emerging discourses of water security to bridge from existing IWRM 
programs to structural governance changes (Cook and Bakker 2012). 
Here, water’s materiality once again constrained and compelled policy 
responses.
Established IOs and new intervenors navigated the challenge of institu-
tional inertia around IWRM – including development and financing com-
mitments – and efforts to reckon with new social and biophysical realities. 
The IWRA continued convening the World Water Congress while the 
World Water Council hosted its World Water Forum. The World Water 
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Forums in the Hague (2000) and Kyoto/Shiga/Osaka (2003) brought 
together experts and government ministers to align the water sector with 
the sustainability agenda then taking shape around the Millennium 
Development Goals. Experts in the water sector, however, were beginning 
to wonder openly whether the discursive consensus of IWRM and water 
scarcity were enough, or effective (Biswas 2004; Gleick and Lane 2005). 
A significant element of the discontent was unease about the conceptual 
lock-in of IWRM at a time when evidence was mounting that humans 
were increasingly driving the global hydrological cycle  – both through 
direct, large-scale appropriation of water and through indirect changes to 
land cover and the global climate system (see Vörösmarty et  al. 2004). 
Several factors led, in fairly rapid succession, to a decade of intense trans-
formation in how IOs affected global water policy: (1) The World 
Economic Forum established itself as an independent assessor of progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goals in 2004, and soon began 
publishing annual risk reports on the state of “global risks” (Schmidt and 
Matthews 2018). (2) Energy and food price shocks in the years preceding 
the 2008 global financial crisis led Ban Ki-moon to ask the World Economic 
Forum to focus on water security at the 2009 meeting in Davos. (3) This 
led to the World Economic Forum (2011) using its discursive influence to 
establish water security as linked to shared structural risks linking across 
what is now known as the water-energy-food nexus (Schmidt and 
Matthews 2018; cf. Pigman 2007). Together, these changes added to 
notions of water scarcity a growing recognition of water security that 
prompted IOs in global water policy to shift away from efforts to use 
water as the material basis for ‘integrating’ various domains of social pol-
icy. Instead, the water-energy-food nexus established a different normative 
basis; water was already integrated across multiple social policy domains 
that produced systemic risks to the global water cycle and to the global 
economy. As such, the task of policy was to govern this form of integra-
tion; or what the World Economic Forum (2011) described as the struc-
tural undervaluation of water in the global economy.
Established IOs such as the Global Water Partnership responded to 
these changes by renovating existing institutional stances. For instance, 
the GWP built on its earlier report on Water as a Social and Economic 
Good and its defense of the Dublin Principles in 1998 through a new tech-
nical report on Water Financing and Governance amid the 2008 global 
financial crisis (Rogers et al. 1998; Rees et al. 2008). Indeed, paralleling 
the broader financialization of the global economy (see Krippner 2012), 
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the water sector turned to financial tools for global water policy, such as 
the use of credit risk ratings, debt-for-water swaps, microcredit schemes 
and infrastructure financing to address issues of water security across the 
water-energy-food nexus (see Kolker et al. 2016; Schmidt and Matthews 
2018). The Global Water Partnership (2012) made special use of resil-
ience to link the systemic risks to water-energy-food nexus and the global 
economy. Here, the water sector paced broader policy discourses that had 
adopted the language resilience after the 2008 financial crisis to bridge 
environmental and economic risks (Cooper 2011). Responses to energy, 
food, climate and financial crises, however, were not sufficient: The 
Millennium Development Goal for water and sanitation was not met. 
Worldwide, billions of people still lack basic sanitation infrastructure and 
hundreds of millions lack access to clean, reliable drinking water.
In 2010, the United Nations passed the Human Right to Water and 
Sanitation. The landmark agreement created a key moment for IOs and 
for states, many of whom had drifted toward (if they had not already 
embraced) enhanced uses of market mechanisms in the water sector. The 
response of IOs created new contests, particularly as new networks like the 
World Economic Forum engaged with large corporate actors (PepsiCo, 
Coca-Cola, Nestlé) to forge new working groups, such as the 2030 
Working Group, that sought input into the Sustainable Development 
Goals. While civil society organizations interpreted the Human Right to 
Water and Sanitation as a clear victory over privatization and other neolib-
eral agendas, many global IOs took the view that the best way to deliver 
on the right to water was through the market. Here, World Bank pro-
grams on “water for all” that had established transnational policy expertise 
sought to capture the right to water and to channel it into existing struc-
tures of political economy (Goldman 2009). Debates over the right to 
water continue, especially as different approaches to utilizing the right are 
mobilized across different legal and social contexts (see Langford and 
Russell 2017; Sultana and Loftus 2020).
A final, further twist was added to the field of IOs as the OECD (2013, 
2017) began to position itself with respect to water security, global gover-
nance, and the nexus of land, water, and energy. The OECD had long had 
an interest in water and governance, and its increased attention to the 
portfolio came just as the UN created the High-Level Panel on Water as 
part of its efforts to develop political momentum to deliver on the 2015 
Sustainable Development Goals. Here, water policy reflected shifts in 
global governance that increasingly use ‘goals’ or targets to steer both 
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states and markets (see Kanie and Biermann 2017). The UN High-Level 
Panel likewise used the language of resilience to describe complex systems 
in terms of responses to disturbance, and as being subject to critical thresh-
olds, shocks, and tipping-points. These descriptions of interconnected 
economic and environmental systems mirrored the discourse of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, where resilience was increasingly used to 
link global environmental risks to the sustainability agendas (e.g. Sachs 
2015). From 2016 to 2018, the UN High-Level Panel on Water com-
pleted its first major initiative on “valuing water” and committed to the 
human right to water while positioning that right amid discourses of 
enhancing resilience across economic and environmental systems (Schmidt 
2020). In so doing, the High-Level Panel did not, as originally hoped, get 
through the bricolage of global water contests. Instead, it has reaffirmed 
the central discourses IOs have developed and employed by naturalizing 
the form of ‘integration’ achieved under neoliberal programs through 
which human impacts on the global water cycle, and the Earth system in 
general, have been amplified (see also Schmidt 2019).
concluSIon
IOs have played multiple, critical roles in global water policy. There is 
much more to be researched and examined about them – water continues 
to disobey political boundaries. The aim of this chapter has been to argue 
for a treatment of water as global social policy. To do so requires tracking 
the architecture of arguments through which a particular and powerful 
social view of water has come to dominate global water governance 
through discourses of control, integration, scarcity, and security. This has 
involved IOs working in multiple ways to: negotiate international agree-
ments, facilitate international scientific collaborations, define integrated 
approaches to water management, and to align water with emerging 
development agendas in the context of economic and environmental crises.
There are many dissenting narratives occluded from, and deliberately 
excluded by, the current architecture of global water governance. The 
upshot is that the water risks faced by those marginalized in intersectional 
ways across both urban and rural areas, and in view of colonial histories 
and ongoing settler colonial structures, remain unaddressed. And this is 
only to constrain the explication of risks to our own species. One implica-
tion of the foregoing argument is that further, critical study of water as 
global social policy is paramount to reckoning with the social power that 
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continues to be wielded through control over it. A second is that, in order 
to follow through on not treating water as merely instrumental to other 
policy domains, it is essential to confront the material reality that multiple 
other domains – such as health, education, and industry – are interdepen-
dent with water. So, it will not do to think of water non-socially, nor to 
hope we can make whatever we like out of water. Rather, it is imperative 
to treat water as not only natural and not wholly social, and to develop an 
architecture for global social policy capacious enough to govern water 
equitably.
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